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In the United States a growing fraction of Medicaid participants are enrolled in Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). The HMOs contract with physicians to provide health care 
services to the enrollees. Generally the physicians are compensated either via fee for service 
(FFS) or capitated arrangements. This paper investigates whether the means by which the 
physicians are compensated influences the quality of care received by enrollees. Using data for all 
Medicaid HMO enrollees in a large state, we find that enrollees in HMOs that pay their Primary 
Care Physicians (PCPs) exclusively via FFS arrangements are more likely to receive services for 
which the HMO’s PCPs receive additional compensation. Further, these enrollees are less likely 
to receive services for which the HMO’s PCPs do not receive additional compensation. These 
findings suggest that financial incentives may influence the behavior of PCPs in Medicaid HMOs, 
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 Introduction 
  The Medicaid program, already one of the largest social programs in the United 
States, is growing rapidly. Between 1996 and 2004, the number of Medicaid enrollees 
increased by roughly one-third, from 33 million to 44 million [1]. In an attempt to control 
the cost of the Medicaid program and to improve the quality of care provided to enrollees, 
many states have moved enrollees into health maintenance organizations (HMOs) (also 
known as managed care organizations). During the same 1996 to 2004 time period, the 
fraction of Medicaid enrollees in managed care organizations increased by approximately 
one-half, from 40% to over 60% [1]. The trend towards managed care does not appear to be 
slowing. For instance, in December 2005 the governor of Florida signed a bill that requires 
all of the state’s Medicaid enrollees eventually be enrolled in HMOs [2]. 
State Medicaid programs often contract with HMOs to care for the health care needs 
of Medicaid participants. The HMOs, in turn, contract with doctors and other health care 
providers to deliver necessary health care services. HMOs employ different payment 
arrangements to compensate their doctors. FFS and capitated payment arrangements are 
common. Under a FFS arrangement, the doctor is paid according to the services she 
provides to an enrollee. Under a capitated payment arrangement, the doctor is paid a fixed 
amount per enrollee regardless of the health care services actually provided to the enrollee. 
Consequently, a doctor paid via FFS can increase her revenue by providing additional 
services, whereas a capitated doctor can not. 
Preventive care is a major focus of the Medicaid program, especially for children 
[3]. Preventative care can both reduce treatment costs and avoid debilitating illness. 
Routine well-child visits and the provision of asthma medications are two important forms of preventive care. Annual well-child visits allow doctors to monitor enrollees’ health and 
deliver essential, routine health care services such as immunization shots. Such visits can 
reduce the incidence of potentially avoidable hospitalizations [4,5]. Asthma is a major 
public health problem affecting Americans of all ages, races, and ethnic groups. Children 
are particularly affected with more than six million children diagnosed with asthma. The 
economic burden of this disease is substantial, with national annual health care costs of $3 
billion. Successful clinical management of asthma in children has the potential to decrease 
this burden by lowering the disproportionate costs arising from hospitalization and acute 
care [6]. Part of successful clinical management includes adhering to National Heart Lung 
and Blood Institute (NHLBI) guidelines for asthma medication. Adherence to these 
guidelines is associated with decreased hospitalizations, emergency room use, and 
outpatient acute care visits [7]. 
This paper investigates whether the means by which HMOs compensate their 
Primary Care Physicians (PCPs) influence the likelihood that Medicaid enrollees receive 
these important forms of preventive care and appropriate medications for the treatment of 
asthma. Using data for all of the Medicaid HMO enrollees in a large state,
a we find that 
enrollees in HMOs that pay their PCPs exclusively via FFS arrangements are more likely to 
receive routine well-child visits. Further, enrollees in these HMOs who have persistent 
asthma are less likely to receive appropriate medications to treat their condition. These 
findings suggest that financial incentives may influence the behavior of PCPs in Medicaid 
HMOs, and thus the health care received by Medicaid participants enrolled in HMOs. 
Numerous studies have analyzed whether the form of physician pay influences the 
level of care provided to HMO enrollees. The papers suggest such a link often is present. 
1 For example, Hillman, Pauly, and Kerstein [8] report that hospitalization rates are higher 
for enrollees whose physicians are paid via FFS rather than capitation. Stearns, Wolfe, and 
Kindig [9] find that specialist referrals, hospital admissions, and hospital length of stays fall 
when an HMO switches from FFS physician payment to capitation payment. Ransom et al. 
[10] report that gynecologists tend to provide fewer elective surgical procedures when their 
payment method is changed from FFS to capitation. Shrank et al. [11] find that fewer 
cataract procedures are performed when physicians are moved to capitation. In contrast, 
Conrad et al. [12] do not find any significant effects of physician payment method on health 
care utilization.  
Our analysis enhances the literature in three important respects. First, we examine 
differences in the behavior of FFS and capitated PCPs for services that have different 
effects on the PCPs’ financial payoffs. As noted, we find that FFS PCPs deliver more 
services that increase their revenues than capitated PCPs. However, corresponding 
differences are not detected on services that do not increase physician revenue. Second, we 
consider services for which there are clearly stated and widely accepted norms for the 
proper level of care. Consequently, we are able to assess whether financial incentives affect 
the extent to which actual care departs from the most appropriate level of care. Third, we 
examine the health care services delivered to Medicaid enrollees, who often are especially 
at risk of not obtaining the proper level of care. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the services we analyze and 
explains how the profits of FFS and capitated PCPs are affected by the delivery of these 
services. Section 3 describes our data and empirical specification. Section 4 presents our 
findings. Section 5 provides conclusions and directions for future research. 
2 Background Information 
While both well-child visits and asthma medications can be beneficial to enrollees, 
these two forms of care can affect the immediate costs of PCPs differently. In the state 
studied here, the cost of a well-child visit is borne by the PCP that performs the well-child 
visit. In contrast, the Medicaid program pays for prescribed asthma medications. 
Consequently, the amount of asthma medication prescribed has no direct financial impact 
on either the HMO or its PCPs. This difference in the incidence of the costs of well-child 
visits and asthma medications is an important element of the ensuing analysis. 
The provision of preventive care can have differential effects on the revenue of 
different PCPs. Capitated PCPs receive no additional revenue when they provide well-child 
visits, but do incur the cost of providing the visits.
b Conversely, because they are 
reimbursed for each service they provide, FFS PCPs secure additional revenue from every 
well-child visit they perform. Thus, capitated PCPs may be less motivated to encourage 
well-child visits because they are not reimbursed directly for the visits. 
Prescribing asthma medications does not have an immediate financial impact on 
either capitated or fee-for-service PCPs. However, the longer-term effects from these 
prescriptions may differ. Asthma medications can reduce the costs of the capitated PCP by 
limiting the need for future office visits to deal with the complications of asthma. In 
contrast, to the extent that the prescribed asthma medications control the symptoms of 
asthma and thereby reduce future office visits, additional prescriptions can reduce the 
revenue of a FFS PCP. Thus, FFS PCPs may be less motivated to encourage this type of 
care. 
3 This paper compares the extent to which FFS and capitated PCPs in Medicaid 
HMOs provide well-child visits and asthma medications. Given the differences in the 
compensation structures the FFS and capitated PCPs face, our findings may provide some 
useful evidence about how financial incentives affect the quality of care received by HMO 
enrollees. 
 
Data and Empirical Specification 
Our data is of two types: enrollment and encounter data and data from interviews. 
The enrollment and encounter data is for the population of children enrolled in a Medicaid 
HMO in the state in question in 2004
c,d. This enrollment data contains demographic 
information for each enrollee; the encounter data records the enrollee’s usage of medical 
services, including office visits, medical treatments, and pharmaceutical prescriptions. The 
encounter data also documents diagnoses made by the physician when treating the 
enrollee.
e
The interview data is derived from interviews with personnel from the HMOs. The 
HMOs in our sample are required to answer questions posed by the state regarding various 
characteristics of their organization. Among the questions asked is how the HMO 
compensates its PCPs.
f
The dependent variables in the analysis are based on measures established in the 
Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) developed by the National 
Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) [13]. HEDIS measures are used to evaluate the 
care received by HMO enrollees and are widely used by industry participants. These 
measures are based on diagnosis codes and treatment codes found in enrollee encounter 
4 data and the ages of the enrollees.
g The measures are binary: one indicates that the proper 
care was provided; zero indicates otherwise. The measures are based on treatment received 
over a twelve month period and specify the age ranges of the enrollees to be included. The 
treatment period examined in the analysis below is January 2004 - December 2004. 
The first HEDIS measure analyzed is whether the enrollee received at least one 
well-child visit during the treatment period. Two age cohorts are analyzed: children 
between 3 and 6 years of age; and adolescents between the ages of 12 and 21.
h  The success 
rates (i.e., the fraction of the relevant population receiving a well-child visit) for the 
younger and older age cohorts are 50% and 32%, respectively, in our sample.  
The second HEDIS measure we analyze is whether children with persistent asthma 
had prescriptions filled for appropriate medications.
i This measure is based on two years of 
data. Data from 2003 are examined for evidence of persistent asthma. Data for 2004 are 
examined for evidence of appropriate medication. The age cohorts employed for this 
analysis are 5 through 9 and 10 through 18. The success rates (i.e., the fraction of the 
relevant population that had a prescription for an appropriate asthma medication filled) for 
these cohorts on this measure in our sample are 51% and 54%, respectively. 
The explanatory variables reflect HMO operating characteristics and enrollee 
demographics. The HMO operating characteristic of primary interest is whether the HMO 
compensates all of its PCPs via FFS arrangements. During the HMO interviews, each HMO 
is asked to report the percent of its PCPs that are paid via FFS arrangements. The 
distribution of answers was bimodal, with five of the eight HMOs in our sample stating that 
they pay roughly 100% of their PCPs via FFS
j and three HMOs stating that they pay 85%
k 
5 of their PCPs via FFS. This bimodal distribution underlies our treatment of this variable as 
binary.  
Two other variables are included to control for the practices of the HMO: whether 
HMO case managers work directly with the primary care physicians
l and whether the HMO 
makes reminder calls to enrollees immediately prior to their well-child visits. (This latter 
variable is included only in the analyses of the HEDIS well-child visit measure.) The other 
variables included to control for characteristics of the HMO are the for-profit/non-profit 
status of the HMO, the number of enrollees (Medicaid and otherwise) the HMO serves, the 
percent of the HMO’s enrollees that are in Medicaid, and the number of years the HMO has 
been operating in the state in any capacity.
m
Table 1 lists the operating characteristics of the HMO attributes included in the 
estimation. As the table indicates, there is significant heterogeneity among the HMOs for 
each of the variables employed in the analysis. The smallest HMO has roughly 35,000 
enrollees while the largest has approximately nine times that number. The HMOs also vary 
significantly in their operating practices and in the extent to which their enrollment is 
limited to Medicaid enrollees. Table 1 also summarizes the demographic characteristics of 
the enrollees of each HMO. 
Table 2 presents the success rate for the two HEDIS measures for each value of the 
binary HMO attributes. Children in HMOs that paid all PCPs via FFS arrangements had 
higher well-child visit success rates than HMOs that paid only some of their PCPs via FFS. 
In addition, children in HMOs where case managers worked directly with primary care 
physicians had higher asthma medication success rates. 
6 The demographic variables we employed are gender, race, age, and whether the 
enrollee resides in a rural area. Table 3 presents the values of the demographic variables in 
our sample. Hispanics outnumber blacks and whites, while most enrollees reside in non-
rural areas. The data in Table 4 indicate that, relative to whites and blacks, Hispanic 
children had a higher success rate for well-child visits and lower success rate for asthma 
medications. Also, non-rural children had higher success rates for well-child visits and 
lower success rates for asthma medications. 
The two equations estimated are: 
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where 
   is the binary HEDIS well-child measure for enrollee i in HMO j  j i WCHILD ,
    is the binary HEDIS asthma medication measure for enrollee i 
in      HMO  j 
j i ASTHMA ,
   are enrollee demographic variables  i X
   are HMO attribute variables  j Z
We assume the probability of HEDIS success has a standard normal CDF, and so 
estimate the equations via probit.
n To account for unobserved HMO-level effects [14], the 
observations are clustered by HMO and location.
o
7 Findings 
Table 5 presents the regression estimates. The first two columns in Table 5 contain 
the estimates for the well-child visit measure for the two age cohorts. The last two columns 
contain the estimates for the asthma medication measure for the two age cohorts. 
The first row of data in Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates for the variable 
that indicates whether the HMO pays all of its PCPs via a FFS arrangement. For both age 
cohorts, the well-child visit success rate for enrollees in HMOs that pay all of their PCPs 
via FFS is six percentage points higher than for those enrolled in HMOs that pay some of 
their PCPs via capitation. Given the mean success rates, this difference implies that the 
average probability that an enrollee receives a well-child visit is 10-20% higher in an HMO 
that pays all of its PCPs via FFS.  
The opposite conclusion arises with regard to the asthma medication measure. For 
both age cohorts, the success rate is lower for HMOs that pay all of their PCPs via FFS. 
The effect is statistically significant for the 5-9 year old cohort. The estimates imply that 
the probability that the recommended asthma medications are prescribed is approximately 
5% lower in HMOs that pay all of their PCPs via FFS than in other HMOs.
p
These findings suggest that financial incentives may affect the services PCPs 
provide to Medicaid enrollees. In particular, the services that increase the revenue of FFS 
PCPs (well-child visits) are provided more frequently in HMOs where all PCPs are 
compensated via FFS. Furthermore, the services that could reduce the future revenues of 
FFS PCPs (asthma medication prescriptions) are provided less frequently in HMOs where 
all of the PCPs are paid via FFS. 
8 The other variables that measure HMO attributes generally are not statistically 
significant in our regressions. A larger number of enrollees are associated with a higher 
success rate on the well-child visit measure. However, the effect is of limited statistical and 
economic significance. The probability that an enrollee in the 5-9 year cohort receives the 
recommended asthma medications is higher in HMOs where the case manager works 
directly with the primary care physician. This effect may be due to case managers working 
with children with severe asthma to ensure that they receive the appropriate medications. 
The finding that the probability that an enrollee in the 10-18 year cohort receives the 
recommended asthma medication declines as the percentage of HMO enrollees in Medicaid 
increases may reflect practice style effects in HMOs that serve both commercial and 
Medicaid populations. HMOs may tend to provide relatively high service quality to 
commercial populations in an effort to retain these profitable clients. To the extent that 
Medicaid and commercial enrollees receive the same basic health care services within an 
HMO, HMOs with a larger concentration of commercial enrollees may provide higher 
quality care to their Medicaid enrollees. 
Hispanic children in our sample have a higher likelihood of receiving an annual 
well-child visit and a lower likelihood of receiving asthma medications than black children 
and white children. This result is interesting in light of the “Hispanic paradox” that suggests 
Hispanics tend to have better health outcomes than non-Hispanics of similar socio-
economic status [15,16]. Within age cohorts, younger children generally are more likely 
than their older counterparts to receive well-child visits and asthma medications. (The 
exception is for asthma medications for the 5-9 year cohort.) The finding that 4-year-olds 
receive well-child visits with relatively high frequency likely reflects the fact that parents 
9 often take their children to the PCP to obtain the immunizations required to enter 
kindergarten. Rural residence is associated with reduced (but statistically insignificant) 
performance on the well-child measure and increased (and statistically significant) 
performance on the asthma medication measure for the younger cohort. Families that live in 
rural regions likely have to travel farther for well-child visits, which may reduce the 
likelihood of such visits. However, because they tend to live farther from the PCP’s office 
or the emergency room, parents of rural families may take particular precautions to be sure 
their asthmatic children do not develop serious conditions that would require long trips to 
receive immediate care. 
 
Conclusions 
We have examined whether the form of PCP compensation affects the quality of 
care received by Medicaid HMO enrollees. Our findings suggest that financial incentives 
may influence the services that PCPs deliver to enrollees.  
Further research is required to determine whether our findings persist in other 
settings. The HEDIS measures we employed require that an enrollee be a member of the 
HMO for almost the entire period in question.
q Therefore, our findings pertain only to 
enrollees with relatively stable enrollment. These enrollees may not be entirely 
representative, as many Medicaid enrollees move in and out of Medicaid frequently.  
It would be ideal to be able to identify exactly which PCPs are paid via FFS and 
which are paid via capitation. This information would permit more precise measurement of 
the effects of PCP compensation arrangements on the quality of care they provide. 
10 Finally, time series data for each enrollee would allow for the inclusion of enrollee 
fixed effects. Such effects would control for time-invariant, unobservable characteristics of 





a.  The state is not identified, to preserve confidentiality of key data.  
b.  A well-child visit may reduce long-run costs by allowing the doctor to detect an ailment 
and treat the enrollee before complications arise and the requisite care becomes more 
costly. However, Medicaid enrollees often have limited spells in the program, which 
reduces the likelihood that a capitated doctor would bear the costs of later treatment. 
Furthermore, the probability of such an ailment may be sufficiently small to not justify 
the cost of providing a well-child visit.
c. To calculate the asthma measure, data for 2003 are used to identify children with 
asthmatic symptoms, while data for 2004 are used to determine if these children 
received appropriate medication. 
d. Chronically sick children have more frequent visits to their doctor and, thus, their 
preventative care will likely be less influenced by their doctor’s financial incentives. In 
order to measure the potential effect of these financial incentives on enrollees who are 
more likely to rely on a doctor’s guidance to obtain preventative care, the sample is 
limited to relatively healthy children. Specifically, it is limited to enrollees with a 
clinical risk grouping (CRG) score of one. (CRGs classify individuals into an ordinal 
ranking of healthiness, with one being most healthy. For further information on CRGs, 
11  
 
see Neff, et al [17].) The estimates using all CRGs are largely unchanged and are 
reported in the appendix. 
e. We validated the quality of the encounter data using the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid (CMS) Encounter Validation Protocol, which requires an analysis of missing 
fields, invalid fields, and comparisons between the content of the claims and encounter 
data to documentation in the medical record [18]. Critical information such as ICD-9-
CM and CPT codes were missing or invalid in less than 1% of the cases. Comparisons 
between the claims and encounter data content and the medical record content revealed 
about an 11% under-reporting of services in the encounter data relative to the medical 
record documentation across all enrollees. 
f.  We have access only to aggregate HMO compensation data, not data on how an HMO 
compensates each individual provider. 
g. The measures used in this paper are based on the administrative specification of the 
measures. 
h. The two measures are named, “Well-Child Visits in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Years of Life” (page 177) and “Adolescent Well-Care Visits” (page 180). 
i.  The measure is named “Use of Appropriate Medications for People with Asthma” (page 
104). 
j.  Specifically, the reported percentages were 100%, 100%, 100%, 99%, and 99%. 
k.  Specifically, the reported percentages were 84%, 85%, and 85%. 
l.  HMO case managers are responsible for ensuring that children with chronic conditions 
receive appropriate care. 
12  
 
m. Other HMO variables were considered for inclusion, such as whether the HMO utilizes 
an asthma disease management program and whether financial incentives were used to 
encourage doctors to adhere to clinical guidelines. However, there was little or no 
variation in these variables across the HMOs and thus their effect cannot be identified in 
the regression estimates. 
n. If the enrollees in different HMOs have different unobservable characteristics that make 
them systematically more or less likely to obtain well-child visits or asthma medications, 
the endogeneity of the FFS variable could be a concern. Two factors mitigate this 
concern. First, the enrollee characteristics summarized in Table 1 do not reveal 
systematic differences between the enrollees in the HMOs that pay only via FFS and 
those that utilize capitation. Second, the HMOs are required to accept any qualifying 
Medicaid participant who wishes to enroll, and thus are unable to control directly who 
enrolls in their plans. 
o. By clustering the observations, the estimates of the coefficient standard errors are 
adjusted to allow for the possibility that the observations within each group are not 
independent. The enrollees are grouped here by the HMO in which they are enrolled and 
the metropolitan area in which they reside. 
p. To ensure that the findings are not driven by spurious interaction between the variables 
measuring HMO attributes, the model was also estimated replacing the other HMO 
attributes with HMO dummy variables. The results of this approach, reported in the 
appendix, are very similar to the results presented in the text. (The HMO attributes and 
13  
HMO dummy variables cannot be included simultaneously due to perfect 
multicollinearity between the two sets of variables.) 
q.  For the well-child visit measure, the enrollee must be enrolled in the same HMO for 11 
of the 12 months in question. For the asthma medication measure, the minimum 
enrollment in the same HMO is 22 of the previous 24 months. 
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Attribute HMO #1 HMO #2 HMO #3 HMO #4 HMO #5 HMO #6 HMO #7 HMO #8
Operating Characteristics
PCPs Paid Only via FFS yes/no
1 no yes yes yes yes no yes
M a r k e t s  S e r v e d 31411131
Total Enrollees 292,091 97,606 36,311 34,016 115,230 70,503 116,853 100,710
Years in State 6 8 5 4 17 5 6 7
Fraction of Enrollees in Medicaid 76% 37% 100% 46% 10% 100% 80% 24%
For-Profit yes no no no yes no yes no
Check-Up Visit Reminder Calls yes no no no no yes no yes
Case Manager Works with PCP no yes no yes no yes no no
Enrollee Characteristics
2
% Male 50% 49% 51% 51% 49% 51% 51% 51%
% Black 22% 8% 27% 2% 9% 23% 11% 26%
% Hispanic 60% 80% 60% 95% 68% 67% 76% 58%
% Other Race 3% 1% 3% 0% 0% 2% 1% 3%
% Rural 2% 9% 1% 1% 33% 4% 5% 1%
1 In two of this HMO's markets, some doctors are paid via capitation, while in the third all are paid via FFS.





HEDIS Success Rates by HMO Attribute
Well-Child Visits Asthma Medications
Ages 3-6 Ages 12-21 Ages 5-9 Ages 10-18
Total 50% 32% 51% 54%
Are All PCPs Paid on a Fee-For-Service Basis?
Yes 51% 35% 50% 54%
No 48% 30% 52% 53%
Does HMO Place Reminder Calls?
Yes 51% 33% n/a n/a
No 47% 31% n/a n/a
Does Case Manager Work with PCP?
Yes 50% 33% 55% 57%
No 48% 32% 50% 53%
Is HMO a For-Profit HMO?
Yes 51% 32% 50% 52%
No 48% 32% 52% 57%
17 TABLE 3
Demographic Characteristics By Population
Check-Up Visits Asthma Medications
Ages 3-6 Ages 12-21 Ages 5-9 Ages 10-18
Total 82,227 62,475 1,971 1,756
Gender
Male 41,320 30,899 1,155 985
Female 40,957 31,576 816 771
Race
White 10,290 9,153 288 291
Black 15,699 19,684 585 707
Hispanic 54,315 31,800 1,038 727
Other 1,973 1,838 60 31
Rural
Non-Rural 79,283 60,026 1,890 1,693







HEDIS Success Rates by Population
Check-Up Visits Asthma Medications
Ages 3-6 Ages 12-21 Ages 5-9 Ages 10-18
Total 50% 32% 51% 54%
Gender
Male 50% 32% 51% 52%
Female 50% 33% 51% 56%
Race
White 45% 30% 56% 59%
Black 47% 32% 54% 54%
Hispanic 52% 33% 48% 52%
Other 49% 29% 57% 39%
Rural
Non-Rural 50% 32% 50% 54%
Rural 45% 30% 70% 57%
 
18 TABLE 5
Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions
Dep. Var.: Well-Child Visit Dep. Var.: Asthma Medication
Explanatory Variable Aged 3-6 Aged 12-21 Aged 5-9 Aged 10-18
Mean Probability 0.50 0.32 0.51 0.54
HMO Operating Characteristics
0.05 *** 0.06 *** -0.03 ** -0.02
(3.51) (3.27) (2.00) (0.53)
0.04 * 0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(1.80) (0.79) (0.84) (0.88)
0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.22 ***
(0.96) (0.19) (1.21) (3.90)
-0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.02
(0.18) (0.38) (1.21) (0.37)
-0.02 -0.02
(1.16) (0.75)
0.005 0.03 0.09 *** 0.02
(0.24) (1.43) (3.59) (0.51)
0.004 0.003 0.04 -0.01
(0.76) (0.49) (0.79) (1.32)
Enrollee Characteristics
0.10 *** -0.03 *
(13.08) (1.79)








0.001 -0.01 ** 0.01 -0.04 *
(0.20) (2.48) (0.76) (1.85)
0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.05
(1.39) (1.37) (0.61) (1.15)
0.07 *** 0.03 ** -0.06 -0.09 **
(5.85) (2.46) (1.21) (2.33)
0.03 ** -0.02 * 0.07 -0.22 *
(2.10) (1.75) (0.82) (1.93)
-0.03 -0.03 0.15 ** -0.01
(1.62) (1.08) (2.32) (0.19)
# Observations 82277 62475 1971 1756
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Notes -
The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at the
HMO-market level.
The age dummy variables differ across specifications:
In the well-child visit regressions, age dummy 1 corresponds to 3 years, age dummy 2 corresponds to 4
years, age dummy 3 corresponds to 5 years, age dummy 4 corresponds to 12-15 years, and age dummy 5
corresponds to 16-18 years.
In the asthma medications regressions, age dummy 1 corresponds to 5-7 years and age dummy 2
corresponds to 10-14 years.
PCPs Paid Only via FFS
Years Operating in State
Percent of Enrollees in Medicaid
Other
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Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions - All CRGs
Dep. Var.: Well-Child Visit Dep. Var.: Asthma Medication
Explanatory Variable Aged 3-6 Aged 12-21 Aged 5-9 Aged 10-18
CRG Dummy Variables
-0.05 -0.13 *** -0.40 *** -0.35 ***
(1.41) (5.60) (5.86) (6.22)
0.05 0.04 * -0.32 *** -0.27 ***
(1.19) (1.75) (3.74) (2.95)
0.04 -0.02 -0.42 *** -0.44 ***
(1.08) (1.07) (4.70) (6.39)
0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.94) (0.79) (0.11) (0.10)
HMO Operating Characteristics
0.05 *** 0.06 *** -0.03 ** -0.01
(3.39) (3.02) (2.21) (0.57)
0.04 * 0.02 -0.03 * -0.01
(1.76) (0.74) (1.83) (1.52)
0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.12 **
(0.92) (0.13) (1.30) (2.46)
-0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.01
(0.10) (0.49) (1.26) (0.24)
-0.02 -0.02
(1.18) (0.73)
0.010 0.04 0.07 *** 0.01
(0.32) (1.56) (3.97) (0.20)
0.004 0.002 0.02 *** -0.002
(0.72) (0.33) (3.47) (0.44)
Enrollee Characteristics
0.10 *** -0.04 **
(13.18) (2.20)








-0.001 -0.02 ** 0.03 ** -0.01
(0.23) (2.40) (2.05) (0.83)
0.01 * 0.02 ** -0.01 -0.04
(1.68) (2.16) (0.31) (1.39)
0.07 *** 0.03 *** -0.08 ** -0.07 ***
(5.70) (2.65) (2.23) (2.76)
0.03 ** -0.02 0.05 -0.15 *
(1.99) (1.48) (0.79) (1.73)
-0.03 * -0.02 0.03 -0.01
(1.69) (0.97) (0.64) (0.38)
# Observations 92986 71568 3316 2746
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.09
Notes -
The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at the HMO-market
level.
The age dummy variables differ across specifications:
In the well-child visit regressions, age dummy 1 corresponds to 3 years, age dummy 2 corresponds to 4 years, age
dummy 3 corresponds to 5 years, age dummy 4 corresponds to 12-15 years, and age dummy 5 corresponds to 16-18 years.
In the asthma medications regressions, age dummy 1 corresponds to 5-7 years and age dummy 2 corresponds to 10-14 years.
*** - 99% confidence level, ** - 95% confidence level, * - 90% confidence level
Well-Child Visit Reminder Calls







PCPs Paid Only via FFS
Years Operating in State
Percent of Enrollees in Medicaid
Other












Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions with HMO Fixed Effects
Dep. Var.: Well-Child Visit Dep. Var.: Asthma Medication
Explanatory Variable Aged 3-6 Aged 12-21 Aged 5-9 Aged 10-18
Mean Probability 0.50 0.32 0.51 0.54
HMO Operating Characteristics
0.03 ** 0.03 * -0.04 -0.07 **
(2.29) (1.76) (1.37) (2.50)
Enrollee Characteristics
0.10 *** -0.03 *
(13.12) (1.75)








0.001 -0.01 ** 0.01 -0.04 *
(0.20) (2.50) (0.75) (1.84)
0.02 * 0.02 ** 0.03 -0.04
(1.80) (2.04) (0.62) (1.10)
0.07 *** 0.03 *** -0.06 -0.08 **
(6.19) (2.97) (1.19) (1.98)
0.03 ** -0.02 0.08 -0.21 *
(2.23) (1.59) (0.81) (1.80)
-0.03 * -0.03 0.15 ** -0.01
(1.84) (1.40) (2.31) (0.19)
# Observations 82277 62475 1971 1756
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Notes -
HMO fixed effect coefficients omitted for brevity.
The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at the
HMO-market level.
The age dummy variables differ across specifications:
In the well-child visit regressions, age dummy 1 corresponds to 3 years, age dummy 2 corresponds to 4
years, age dummy 3 corresponds to 5 years, age dummy 4 corresponds to 12-15 years, and age dummy 5
corresponds to 16-18 years.
In the asthma medications regressions, age dummy 1 corresponds to 5-7 years and age dummy 2
corresponds to 10-14 years.
*** - 99% confidence level, ** - 95% confidence level, * - 90% confidence level
PCPs Paid Only via FFS
Other
Age Dummy 1
Age Dummy 2
Age Dummy 3
Age Dummy 4
Age Dummy 5
Rural
Male
Black
Hispanic
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